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Thispaperpresents a framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of internal vs.
external capital allocation. We focus primarily on comparinganinternal capital market tobank
lending.While bothrepresent centralized forms offinancing,in theformercasethefinancing
isowner-provided,whilein thelatter case it is not.Weargue thattheownership aspect of
internalcapital allocation has three important consequences: 1) it leads to more monitoring than
bank lending; 2) it reduces managers' entrepreneurial incentives; and 3) it makes it easier to
efficiently redeploy the assets of projects that are perfotming poorly under existing management.
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and NBERA central goal of research in corporate finance is to understand the process by which
capital is allocated to the corporate sector. In most work, the focus is on providers of capital
that are externaltothe firm, e.g., the bond market, the stock market, banks and finance
companies. Yet, an important part of the capital allocation process takes place in internal
markets in which corporate headquarters allocate capital to their business units.
The importance of internal capital markets is underscored by data from the Dircctonj
ofCorporate Affiliations[1994]which lists 31,419 business units of 3,799 parent companies.
Thus, for every company that raises capital from external markets, there are roughly eight
internal capital allocation decisions that are made at the business-unit level. Moreover, many
of these internal capital market transactions could, in principle, be carried out in external
markets. For example, General Electric allocates capital internally to business units as
diverse as GE Appliances and GE Plastics, while comparable stand-alone operations such as
Maytag (appliances) and A. Schulman (plastics) raise funds directly from the capital market.
What are the costs and benefits of internal versus external financing? An old argument,
due to Alchian [1969] and Williamson (1975), contends that a key advantage of an internal
capital market is that it shields investment projects from the information and incentive
problems that plague external finance. For example, Alchian writes:
The investment funds (capital) market within General Electric is fiercely com-
petitive and operates with greater speed to clear the market and to make informa-
tion more available to both lenders and borrowers than in the external 'normal'
markets. In fact, I conjecture that the wealth growth of General Electric derives
precisely from the superiority of its internal markets for exchange and realloca-
tion of resources — a superiority arising from the greater (cheaper) information
about people and proposals.
The crux of Alchian's argument is thus that headquarters does a good job of monitoring
and information production. However, it is not clear why headquarters is any better in this
regard than, say, a bank lender of the sort envisioned in the delegated monitoring modelsof
Diamond (1984). In other words, the benefits that Alchia.n attributes to an internal capital
market may simply be benefits of centralized finance, benefits that could be realized in an
external market by raising capital from a single (centralized) source. Indeed, in the example
above, Maytag and A. Schulman both have a substantial amount of bank debt outstanding.
What then are the differences between centralized external finance (e.g., bank debt)
and an internal capital market? In our view, an important distinction between the twomodes of financing is that in an internal market, corporate headquarters owns the business
units to whichitallocates capital, whereas in an external market, a bank does not own the
firms to which it lends. FollowingGrossmanand Hart [1986], we take ownership to mean
residual control rights over the use of the firm's assets. Thus, in an internal capital market
these control rights reside with the capital supplier (corporate headquarters), while in a
bank-lending arrangement they reside with the firm's manager (not the bank). We argue
that giving control rights to the capital supplier, as in an internal capital market, has three
important consequences:
1) Increased monitoring incentives. Even if internal and external providers of capital
have the same ability to monitor, internal providers will choose to monitor more intensely.
This is because they have residual control over the assets, and therefore get more of the
gains from monitoring. We are therefore able to put on firmer theoretical footing Alchian's
argument in favor of internal capital markets —thatthey are associated with a better flow
of information between users and providers of capital.
2) Decreo.sed entrepreneurial incentives. Giving control rights to capital providers
through an internal capital allocation process is costly, however, in that it diminishes man-
agerial incentives. Because the manager does not have control, lie is more vulnerable to
opportunistic behavior by corporate headquarters. Thus, the manager may not get all of the
rents from his efforts, which reduces his incentives.
:3) Betterassetredeployability.Whencorporate headquarters owns multiple related
business units,there is an added advantage of an internal capital market. If one unit per-
forms poorly, its assets can be redeployed efficiently: they can be directly combined with the
other assets controlled by corporate headquarters. In contrast, an external provider would
have to sell the assets to another user and may not get paid their full value.
The starting point for our analysis is a financing model based on Hart and Moore
[l989J and Bolton and Scharfstein [1990, 1993]. This model, which is presented in Section
I, initially makes no distinction between bank finance and internal finance. This distinction
is introduced in Section II, where we also show how the allocation of control rights affects
monitoring incentives and entrepreneurship.' Section III focuses on how internal capital
allocation improves asset redeployability when the firm owns multiple related business units.
9Section IV concludes the paper.
I. A BasicModel ofCentralized Finance
The focus of our analysis is an investment project that requires an outlay of K at
an initial date 0, in order to purchase some physical assets. The project also requires the
services of a manager who has no wealth of his own. As will become clear, the manager's
lack of wealth leads to agency problems in funding the project.
The project has a life of two periods. At date 1 the project produces a random cash
flow of either x (with probability p) or zero (with probability 1 —p).This date-I cash flow is
observable to the manager and any potential investor, but is not "verifiable," i.e., it cannot
be observed by outside parties and therefore contracts cannot be made contingent on its
realization. Moreover, the manager can, if he chooses, costlessly divert all of the cash flow
to himself. This formulation captures the notion that there is an agency problem because
managers can spend corporate resources on perks, pet projects, etc., and that such spending
cannot be directly controlled through contractual means.2
The project also has economic value at date 2, although this date-2 value depends
on how the assets are deployed. If the original manager continues to work with the assets,
they produce a cash flow of y with certainty at date 2. We assume that this "continuation"
scenario is the most efficient way to use the assets. The only drawback is that continuation
enables the manager to divert the non.verifiable cash flow, y.
-
Theproject can also be "liquidated" after date 1, where liquidation can be thought
of as the process of separating the original manager from the assets. Liquidation yields a
value of L, where L cy.The costs of liquidation thus stem from the fact that the assets are
not as productive when redeployed without the manager. The benefit of liquidation is that
managers can no longer divert cashflows to themselves, so investors can obtainthe entire
value L.
This basic formulation follows that of Hart and Moore [1989) and Bolton and Scharf.
stein [1990, 1993]. However, we differ from this previous work in our more detailed description
of the determinants of asset values, both in the continuation and liquidation scenarios. In
our model, both y and L will ultimately be endogenously determined, and will depend on
the mode of financing. These variables will be endogenous because, in general, they can de-
3pend on actions taken by both the manager and the investor. The manager's and investor's
actions will in turn depend on the incentives associated with a given mode of financing.
As shown in Hart and Moore [1989] and Bolton and Scharfstein [1990, 1993], the
optimal contract calls for a repayment of D at date 1; if no such payment is made, the
investors have the right to seize the project's assets. This contract gives the manager some
incentive to make the payment D when he has enough cash to do so because if the manager
fails to pay, the assets may be liquidated and he will lose the ability to divert cash to himself
at date 2.
A key question in this model is the following: How large a repayment D can actually
be extracted from the manager? To answer this question, note first that if the manager
paysDwhen he has cashflow of x, the investor has no further leverage over the manager
and he will therefore divert allofthe date-2 cash flow of y to himself. One can therefore
think of y as the "private benefit" that accrues to a manager if he makes the payment D.
If the manager has cashfiow of x and chooses not to make the payment D, the investor
has the right to liquidate the project. In this case, the investor would receive L and the
manager would forfeit y. Given that such liquidation is inefficient (y >L)we would expect
the manager and the investor to renegotiate to avoid liquidation. Under the assumption of
efficient Nash-like bargaining, the two parties would split the resulting surplus, y —L.If
the manager's share of this surplus is /340, 1] and the investor's is 1 —fi, thenthe manager
receives $[y —U,the investor receives /3L + (1 —/3)y,and the project is not liquidated. In
order for the payment D to be incentive compatible, it must be less than what would be
paid out in such a renegotiation. That is, D must be less than flU + (1 —$)y.The more
bargaining power the manager has, the lower is the threshold level of D.
Of course, when the project does not generate any cash at date I, there is no scope for
renegotiation —themanager does not have the cash to induce the investor not to liquidate.
in this case, the manager defaults, and the asset is actually seized by the investors even
though its value in this liquidation scenario, U, is less than its value under continuation, y.4
Given these assumptions, we can now calculate the net cx ante return (which we define
as R) to the investor for a given face value of the contract D:
(1) R=pD+(l—p)L—K.
4Since thefinancingcontract must satisfy the incentive constraint, D ￿ fJL + (1 —$)y, as
wellas the investor'sparticipationconstraint, 1?￿ 0, theprojectcanbe financedonlyifthe
following condition is met5:
(2) p[j3L+(l—Ø)y+(1—p)L—K￿O.
11(2)issatisfied,competition among investors impliesthat D willbechosen such that Ft =0.
The expected payoff of the manager will be:
(3) p[x+y]+(1—p)L—K
By contrast,ifthere were no agency problems, the project would be financed as long
as it has positive net presentvalue:
(4) px+y—K￿O.
In this case, (4) is alsotheexpected payoff of the manager.
There are two types of inefficiencies arising from agency problems. The first is an cx
post inefficiency that arises once the project is financed. Since investors always earn zero
profits. (4) minus (3) gives the difference in surplus generated by the two regimes. Thus, our
cx post measure of inefficiency is:
(5) XP=(1—p)[y—L]
When there areagency problems,the project is inefficiently liquidated in the low cashfiow
state resulting in a loss of y —Lrelative to the first best.
The second type of inefficiency is an cx ante inefficiency that arises because positive
NPV projects may not get financed in the first place. When there are agency problems the
cutoff level of K below which the project will be financed is given by the equality of (2). By
contrast the first best cutoff level is given by the equality of (4). Thus, one simple measure
of the cx ante inefficiency, XA, is the difference in these cutoff levels of K. In a model with
a continuum of projects with varying levels of K, this cutoff level would be related to the
probability that the project could be financed. Subtracting (2) from (4) yields our cx ante
measure of inefficiency:
(6) XA=p[x+fl(y—t)]+(1—p)[yL)
5Equation (6) points to two sources of cxanteinefficiency. The most straightforward
one is reflected in the second term of (6) which is the same as the cx postinefficiency,XP:
becauseprojects are inefficientlyliquidated when cash flows are low, investors are less prone
to anancetheprojectin the first place. Themore subtleinefficiency,reflectedinthe first
bracketedterm, stemsfromincentivecompatibility and renegotiation problems.Managers
cancommitto pay out at most fiL + (1 —$)ywhen cash flows are high even though total
valueinthis caseis r+ y.Thus, investors will be less proneto finance aprojectwhenthe
managerhasmore bargaining power in renegotiation.
Throughout the rest of the analysis, we will compare the efficiency of internal and ex-
ternal markets using this a antemeasure.We choose this measure because wherever there
are cx postinefficienciesthey will show up in our cx ante measure of inefficiency. Thus, all
of the relevant effects we are interested in show up in XA.
II. Should Centralized Finance be Provided by an Owner or a Lender?
A. The Distinction Between Lending and Ownership
The analysis so far is silent on the question of whether the investor should own the
project or lend to the manager who owns the project. At first glance, one might think
that in this model the manager is the owner and there is no real choice to be made about
ownership. This is correct if one accepts the common, informal definition of an owner as the
party with residual claims on the firm's cash flows. Under this definition, the manager is the
only feasible owner in our model since he receives the residual cashflows.
However, as Grossman and Hart ji 9S6] point out, this is an inadequate definition of
ownership. In particular, residual claimants on cashflows do not necessarily have control over
how the assets of the firm are used. Such control is clearly a critical aspect of ownership.
Thus, we follow Grossman and Hart in defining the owner as that party who "has the residual
rights of control of the asset, that is the right to control all aspects of the asset that have
not been explicitly given away by contract" (p. 695). In this definition, ownership is most
meaningful when there are actions that are cx ante noncontractible —i.e.,actions that
cannot be prespecified in a contract between two parties. In such cases, an asset's owner is
the one who can choose whether or not to undertake the noncontractible action.
6The model of Section 1 does not really address the issue of ownership because the
model does not incorporate the sort of noncontractible actions envisioned by Grossman and
Hart.6 On the one hand, the model can be interpreted as one in which the manager of the
project owns the assets and borrvwsfroma bank. Under this interpretation, Disa required
debt payment and the manager has control over the assets as long as he can make the debt
payment. If he cannot make the debt payment, he must cede control of the assets to the
tender.
On the other hand, one can also interpret the same contract as one where corporate
headquarters owns the project and provides financing. Under this interpretation, headquar-
ters signs an incentive contract with the manager that specifies the following: if the manager
returns Dtoheadquarters, then he gets to keep his job; if not, then he is fired.'
Given the absence of noncontractible actions it does not matter whether the manager
owns the project (and finances with a bank) or whether headquarters owns the project (and
allocates capital internally). Our goal in this section is to introduce two noncontractible
actions that generate a distinction between these modes of financing: investor monitoring
and managerial effort.
B. Ownership and Monitoring
We begin with the effect of ownership structure on monitoring incentives. Specifically,
suppose that at some date between 0 and I — call it date — investors can monitor
the project. This monitoring does not directlyraiseasset values, but instead generates
economically valuable "ideas". These ideas must be "implemented" for any value to be
realized, and only the asset's owner has the right to decide whether or not to implement any
of the ideas generated by the monitoring process.
To take a concrete example, the investor, may in the course of monitoring, notice that
the project's assets require some maintenance work. If the investor owns the project, he
can ensure that the maintenance work is carried out; he can hire the needed workers and
let them into the plant. In contrast, if the manager owns the project, the investor can only
suggest that maintenance would be a good idea; the manager gets to decide whether or not
to actually permit such maintenance. To the extent that maintenance primarily raises the
liquidation value L,itwill be in the investor's interest at date , but not in the manager's
7interest. In suchcases,it matterswho is given ownership of the project.If monitoring and
maintenance are valuable, but the manager is not inclined to implement any maintenance
work, it may make sense for the investor to own the project.
We assume that the investor can exert some monitoring effort, costing m per unit
of effort. The greater is in, the better are the ideas generated. These ideas could, in
principle, lead to a variety of improvements which could be modeled as increases in expected
cash flows (i.e., increases in p, x, or y) or as increases in liquidation values (i.e., increases
in L). As the foregoing discussion suggests, we are most interested in those ideas which
entail some conflict over implementation between the investor and the manager. This is
whywefocus on the effect of monitoring on L, and assume that if the ideas generated by
monitoring are indeed implemented, L L(m). More specifically, we choose the functional
form L =9(rn)Lo,where O(m) is an increasing, concave function, with 0(0) =1.If the ideas
are not implemented, L is equal to L0. In all cases, L(m) <y.
How much monitoring will actually take place in equilibrium? We solve the problem by
working backwards. Once the monitoring has taken place, there is an expected benefit of (I —
p)(O(m)—l)L0 to be realized by implementing the idea. This benefit is simply the probability
of default, times the increase in liquidation value that comes from implementation.
All of this benefit accrues to the investor. Therefore, if the investor is an owner, he
will certainly implement the idea. This implies that the optimal level of monitoring in an
internal capital market, denoted by in;, satisfies:
(7) (I —p)9'(m;)Lo =1.
Now suppose that the investor is not an owner, but rather a lender. Now once the idea
has been generated, only the manager has the right to proceed with implementation. He
can therefore hold up the investor for a fraction —callit y —ofthe surplus generated by
implementation. Since the investor can no longer keep all of the benefits from monitoring,
his incentive to do so is diminished. Accordingly, the optimal level of monitoring for a bank
lender, denoted by In8, is given by:
(8) (1 —7)(l —p)0'(m9)Lo =1
Thus, we have established that there is more monitoring when the project is financed
8by an owner (the internal capital market) than by a tender. While an internal market gen-
erates the first-best level of monitoring, banks provide too little monitoring. We return to
discuss the cx ante efficiency consequences of these results in Section £1.0 below.
C. Ownership and Managerial Entrepreneurship
While an internal capital market may generate more monitoring than bank lending, it
may also have some offsetting disadvantages. We now focus on one of these —theeffect of
ownership on managerial entrepreneurship.
To this point we have assumed that the continuation value of the project, y, is exoge-
nously fixed. Moreover, we have also assumed that if the project is indeed continued, the
manager is able to divert all of the continuation value to himself —theinvestor keeps only
D, and nothing else.
More realistically, the manager's ability to divert the ongoing proceeds from the project
to himself are likely to depend on ownership structure. Consider first the debt interpretation
of the contract. As long as the manager has made the payment of D at date 1, he retains
complete control rights through date 2. Thus, it seems plausible that his ability to enjoy
private benefits will be high.
Theownershipinterpretation of the contract is a bit subtler. If the project is owned
bytheinvestor, the manager does not necessarily have complete control rights through date
2 even if he makes the required payment D at date 1. Of course, the manager has some
contractualprotection at date 2 —thecontract effectively promises that if the manager
returns D to the parent firm, he gets to keep his job. If such contractual protection for the
manager were not feasible, the whole financing scheme would unwind. For note that cxpost,
onceD has been paid to the parent firm, it will always be in the parent's interest to separate
the manager from the assets. Such cxpost opportunismwould deprive the manager of any
private benefits, and enable the parent to realize £ on top of the date-I payment of D.
Thus, in order for owner-provided financing to exist at all, it must be that one can
write a contract that allows the manager to stay on and enjoy some private benefits at date
2. As noted earlier, this could be accomplished, for example, if one could write a contract of
the form: "if you (the manager) turn over D at date 1, you cannot be fired." However, the
subtlety is that promising not to fire someone is not necessarily the same thing as giving them
9complete control (which is what happens with a debt contract). For example, the parent-
owner might obey the terms of the contract by not firing the manager, but might transfer
him to a different office, thereby interfering with his ability to enjoy private benefits, If such
inter-office transfers were non-contractible, there would be no way of preventing this sort of
partial opportunism with owner-provided financing.8
The bottom line is that with owner-provided financing, managers' date 2 private ben-
efits may be somewhat protected, but not as well protected as with debt financing. To
capture this notion, we make the following assumption: If the project is continued at date 2
and generates an overall value of y, the owner is able to capture a fraction çby, leaving the
manager with only (1 —
Thusin some sense, owner-provided financing is more "equity-like". Not only does the
parent get a fixed payment D at date I (so long as the date-i cashflow is positive), it also
captures a share of the continuing value y at date 2.
This sharing of the continuation value can have cx ante incentive effects, if y is sensitive
to managerial effort. To see this, suppose that at some point between date 1 and date 2
—callit date I —themanager must exert some entrepreneurial effort e, and yy(e)
where y(e) is an increasing, concave function)° Knowing that he will have to share y with
an owner, the manager will exert less effort than he would were the project debt-financed.
indeed, when the project is debt-financed, the manager's effort level satisfies y'(e) =
1.Denote this effort level by Cc' (for "first-best"), and let y(ep)YF- Finally, define
Ypyp —cc'.Intuitively, Y1r is the net-of-effort continuation value when the project is
debt-financed.
Whentheproject is owner-financed, the manager's effort level satisfies (I —)y'(e) =1.
Denote this effort level by eg (for "second-best") let y(es)ys, and Vs y —eg.Clearly
Y > k's, since Yp is the maximal value of y —e.
D. The Ex Ante Efficiency of Internal and External Markets
We now calculate the cx ante efficiency of internal and external markets and compare
them. In an external market, the cx ante measure of inefficiency is:
(9)XAa4 =p(z+ J3(Yç' —La))+ (1 —p)(Yp
—La)+ ma + (1 —p)7(La
—
10where LBeL(m8)isthe liquidation value given bank monitoring of mB.
Thefirst twoterms of (9) are identical to the cx ante measure (6) except that in (9)
y andL areendogenous.Thethird term is the direct monitoring cost. Finally1 the fourth
termisthesurplus that thebank has to share with the managerinordertoimplementthe
ideas generated bymonitoring.
In aninternal market, the cx ante measure of inefficiency is:
(10) =p[x+ (Yp —Yg)+ fi(Ys —L1)J+ (1 —p)(Y
—L,)+ m1.
We are nowina position to compare the twomodes offinancing directly: Define
(SXA = — The larger is EsXA, the more attractive is internalcapital
allocation relative to bank financing. Using equations (9) and (10), we can write:
AXA=—p(Yp—Ys)+{(l—p)(Lj'— L8)—(mj—ma)}+(1—p)7(La—Lo)+
(11) pfl{(Yp—Lg)—(Ys—Li)}.
Thefirst term, —p(Y—1's), indicates that an external market is more favorable to
the extent that it leads to higher continuation values net of effort costs. The second term,
{(l — p)(Li
—LB)
—(in1 — ins)), indicates that an internal market is more favorable to the
extent that it leads to higher liquidation values net of monitoring costs. The sum of these
two terms is also the difference in the cx post efficiency of internal and external markets.
The third and fourth terms relate to the surplus that is extracted by the manager in ongoing
bargaining over the life of the contract. Both of these terms tend to make internal financing
more attractive than external financing. The third term, (1 — p)-Y(LB—L0),capturesthe
idea that in an external market the manager can extract more of the surplus generated by
investor monitoring at date . The last term captures the idea that in an external market
the manager can extract more rent from the investor by threatening to default at date 1.
This is because the manager's private benefit from continuation is higher and the liquidation
value lower in an external market, i.e. YF—L5>Y5—Li.Looselyspeaking, both the
third and fourth terms suggest that an internal market has the advantage of improving the
investor's bargaining position over the life of the contract, thereby allowing him to recover
more of his investment.
11III. AssetRedeployability and the Financing of Related Projects
A. The Basic Idea
Thus far, we have focused on the financing of a single project in isolation. While this
highlights some of the key distinctions between an internal and external market, it ignores
potential interactions across different projects. We show in this section that internal capital
markets have an added advantage over bank financing when headquarters finances multiple
rrlated projects.
Thebasis of our argument is that it is easier for corporate headquarters to redeploy
assets within the firm than for a bank lender to sell assets externally. To see why this is
important, suppose that there are two biotechnology projects, A and B. Both have their own
managers and their own specialized assets. Now suppose that project A perfonns poorly,
and in the language of our model, is in default at date 1. At the same time, project B
performs well, and does not default.
The bank will clearly wish to separate the assets from the manager of project A. But
how are these project-A assets to be redeployed? The bank would probably not want to
manage them itself, given that it has no managerial expertise in biotechnology. A better
alternative would be to redeploy the assets to the next highest value user. In this case,
suppose it is project B with its related assets and managerial expertise.
However, since the bank does not own project B, the hank cannot directly compel
project B's management to take on the project-A assets. The best the bank can do is to sell
the assets to B at a price somewhere between their value to B and their value to the bank
—thatis, the bank will have to share the surplus with the manager of project B.
Things would work differently if projects A and B were both financed by a single owner
rather than by a lender. Now if the assets from project A need to be redeployed, and the
best way to do so is by combining them with the assets of project B, an owner can directly
effectuate such a combination. An owner does not need to resort to an asset sale, and thus
does not have to share any of the surplus with another party.
The difference between ownership and lending in this example again flows from the
logic of Grossman and Hart [1986], as developed further by Hart and Moore [1990]: "...the
sole right possessed by the owner of the asset is his ability to exclude others from the use
12of the asset". (page1121).Thus when project B's assets are owned by their manager (the
case of bank lending) this manager does not have to accept a combination of the assets of
A and B, and must be bribed. In contrast, when project B's assets are owned by the party
who is also financing project A, the manager of project B cannot prevent the assets of the
two projects from being combined. The result is that "internal liquidations" generate more
value for headquarters than "external liquidations" (assets sales) do for banks.
To develop these ideas formally, we must have a model in which liquidation values
depend on who owns the assets. Until now, we have implicitly assumed that any party who
obtains these assets can redeploy them and obtain the second-best liquidation value, L. This
assumption may be reasonable if the project's assets are primarily non-specific ones such as
land and buildings. However, in other situations, the assumption will be highly implausible.
For example, if the project is biotechnology R&D, a bank is probably a lower value user of
the assets than other biotechnology firms.
To capture this notion in our model, we continue to assume that the first-best use of
the assets generates a continuation value of y(e) in the hands of the original manager. In
addition, efficient redeployment of the assets generates a value of L(m). However, this value
can only be realized if the project's assets are combined with specific "related assets".
The new aspect of the model is that if the project is not efficiently redeployed, say
because it is not combined with the related assets, it generates a value of only (1 —s)L(m),
where 0 cs<1.One can think of s as an index of the "specificity" of the assets —ifs=0,
the assets are completely non-specific and we are back to our earlier formulation. ifs =I,
the assets are completely specific, in the sense that they are worthless unless combined with
the related assets.1' In our previous examples, s would be large for the biotechnology assets
and small for the land and buildings.
B. Internal Capital Allocation with Related Projects
Suppose that headquarters finances two related projects, A and B, in an internal capital
market. We will focus on developing an XA measure for project A which is assumed to be
identical to the project we have been analyzing. For simplicity, suppose that project B is
never in default. As will become clear, this assumption does not entail a meaningful loss of
generality —allthat is really needed for our basic point is that the date-I outcomes of the
13two projects are not perfectly correlated.
The analysis for project A in this case is exactly identical to that in Section ftC
above.In a liquidation scenario, the 'arent can, by virtue of its ownership rights, combine
the project-A assets with the project-B assets, and thereby generate a liquidation value of
L(rn).Thus,our XAmeasurein this case is still given by equation (10).
One question that arises in this case is this: Won't the manager of project B try to
extract some of the surplus from efficient redeployment, sL(m)?Theanswer is that he has
no credible way to do so. If the manager ofprojectB has an incentive contract of the form
described earlier, and he has not defaulted, his options are as follows: 1) He can continue
working with the combined A and B assets. In this case, he derives a date-2 private benefit
of (1 — )yf — e. That is, he gets to enjoy the same net private benefits that he would
were he only managing the project-B assets. 2) Alternatively, the manager of project B can
quit — that is, refuse to work with the combined assets. However, if he does so, he loses the
private benefits that come with managing the assets of project B. Thus, the threat to quit is
not credible, and the manager of project B has no way of holding up headquarters for some
oftheredeployment value.'2
What is crucial to this logic is that, since the manager of project B does not ownB's
assets, he does not have the option to prevent the combination of the A- and B-assets. In
other words, he cannot choose to continue working with only the B-assets. If he did have
this choice — and this will be the case when there is bank financing — he wouldbein a
position to hold up the party seeking to redeploy the A-assets.
C. Bank Financing with Related Projects
Now suppose a single bank finances both projects. Here, the key point is that the
bank cannot obtain the full L(m)whenit has to liquidate project A. The bank, seeking to
maximize its liquidation proceeds, approaches the manager of project B and suggests that
they combine the A-assets and the B-assets. Relative to any other alternative redeployment
strategy, this combination generates a surplus of sL(m).However,since the manager of
project B now also owns the B-assets, he can refuse to accept the proposed combination.
The result is that the bank will have to share a fraction of the surplus with the manager
of project B. If we denote the bank's share of the surplus by a < I, the bank's net proceeds
14from the asset sale are (1 —s+ cxs)L(m) < L(m).
We can now reworkthe XAmeasure in equation (9) accordingly. In particular, we
now have
=p[x+Ø(Yp—(1—s+as)LB)]+(1 —p)[Yp—(1 —s+as)LBJ
(12) +(1 —s + as)U —p)-y(L3
—Lo)+ mB,
where LB L(m9) and m8 now satisfies the new first order condition:
(13) (1 —y)(1—s + as)Q —p)O'(m9)Lo=1.
Now, the bank has an additional reason to monitor less than headquarters —apost the
bank realizes only a fraction of any improvements to liquidation value because it has to share
the surplus sL(m) with the project-B manager.
We can also calculate an analog to equation (11), and revisit the comparison between
internal capital allocation and bank financing:
óXA =—p(Y,
—}'s)+ ((1 —p)[L,—(1—s + as)L5) —(m,
—niB)) +
(14) (1 —p)-y(1
—$+ as)(La —L0)+ pfl{(Yp —(1 —s + as)L2) —(i's
—
Thisexpression for AXA includes all the same basic effects as those in the single-
project model of Section U. In fact, when s =0the two expressions are identical. However,
when s > 0, (14) is greater than (11); internal capital markets have an added advantage over
external markets when the firm owns related assets. In external markets, net liquidation
values are effectively lowered by a factor of (1 —$+ as).
D. Discussion
The critical assumption that underlies this analysis is that in an asset sale, the seller
does not get paid the full first-best redeployment value of the asset. There are two reasons
why this may be the case. First, if buyers have heterogeneous valuations of the asset, the
high bidder only needs to pay the second highest value. Second, as Shleifer and Vishny
[1992] point out, credit constraints can prevent bidders from paying their full reservation
values. Indeed, Asquith, Gertner ana Scharfste.in [19941 provide indirect empirical support
15for these ideas. They find that financially distressed firms are less likely to sell assets when
others in their industry are distressed or have high leverage. A natural interpretation is that
when high-value industry buyers are credit constrained (because of an industry downturn or
high leverage), asset sales generate lower transaction prices and therefore are less attractive.
The main empirical implication that emerges from this analysis is that business-unit
.jnanagers inside related conglomerates will be more likely to be replacedin an internal shake-
up following poor performance than either (1) top managers of comparablestand-alone firms;
or (2) business-unit managers inside unrelated conglomerates. The flip side of this prediction
is that the assets of business units in related conglomerates will be less likely to be sold off to
outside buyers than the assets of comparable stand-alone companies or the assets of business
units in unrelated conglomerates.
Gupta and Govindarajan 119861 that present survey evidence that is loosely consistent
with the implications of our model. In their study of 58 business units in eight large corpora-
tions, they find a weak negative correlation between managerial tenure at the business unit
level and the degree to which the business unit is related to others in the company. This
finding suggests that there is higher managerial turnover in the business units of related
conglomerates than in the business units of unrelated conglomerates. In addition, in their
survey, the managers of related business units report lower job satisfaction than those of
unrelated business units. This finding is consistent with the spirit of our model — in re-
lated conglomerates business-unit managers have less bargaining power and are less able to
extract rents. Of course, there are competing explanations of these results, but they suggest
an avenue for further empirical research.
With regard to asset sales, Kaplan and Weisbach [1992J present evidence that conglom-
erates are four times more likely to sell off their unrelated acquisitions than their related
acquisitions. Although this fact too could have many explanations, it is consistent with
the implication of our model that firms can simply replace managers of poorly-performing
related lines of business, rather than selling the assets of those units.
5. Conclusions
In many ways, our treatmentinternal capital allocation has been a quite narrow
one. We have built the entire analysis on a single key observation — that, unlike external
16bank lending, internal capital allocation gives corporate headquarters the residual rights of
control over the assets inquestion.
Thegood news is that even this very minimalist modeling approach yields some fairly
detailed implications about the strengths and weaknesses of internal vs. external capital
markets. In particular, we have seen that the ownership aspect of internal capital allocation
has three significant consequences: it leads to more monitoring and better asset redeploya-
bility than bank lending, but this comes at the cost of reducing managers' entrepreneurial
incentives.
The bad news is that while we think it represents a useful start, our narrow approach
surely leaves many important things out. Perhaps most notably, we have ignored the poten-
tial for information or agency problems at the level of tbe providerofcapital. In our model,
the bank lenders and corporate headquarters that fund agency-prone projects are themselves
both profit-maximizers and free of any sort of credit constraints.
These assumptions prevent us from addressing a number of potentially interesting
questions. For example, if there are agency problems at the level of the capital provider, one
might ask whether these problems are somehow exacerbated in an internal market — i.e., is
headquarters more inclined to make inefficient investments than a bank lender? One reason
this might be the case flows from the monitoring results we established above. Suppose
that monitoring involves actual on-site visits by the investor's agents, where they interact
with the business-unit managers. The more monitoring, the more such interaction, and the
more scope there is for business-unit managers to engage in influence activities. In other
words, our results on endogenous monitoring tell us that headquarters staff will be in closer
contact with business-unit managers than would be bank loan officers; hence they are more
likely to be wined and dined and ultimately won over by them. This may make it harder for
headquarters staff to perform a useful disciplinary role.
With regard to credit constraints, one might ask the following: if one business unit
of a conglomerate has a very bad year, causing the conglomerate as a whole to be pinched
for cash, how is the investment behavior of its other units affected? Do liquidity problems
somehow spill over from one business unit to another?'3 This would seem to be a promising
direction for future research.
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18Endnotes
1. A similar point in a differentcontc'.t ismade by Aghion and Tirole (1994J.
2.This formulation is an extreme way to model such agency problems in that managers
benefit fully from every dollar that they divert from investors.
3. Note that we are assuming that default is verifiable and that one can write contracts
specifying when the asset is to be transferred from one party to another.
4. In the text we restrict attention to standard debt contracts in which the manager raises
K in funding and promises to return some amount D. However, Oliver Hart has pointed out
an example of a non-standard contract that avoids cx post inefficient liquidation. Suppose
D =ooand the investor provides a date-O transfer to the manager of t in excess of K.
Suppose also that the investor has all the bargaining power in renegotiation. In this case,
the manager always defaults. The manager's value from continuing is y. When cashfiows
are high the manager can afford to pay y to avoid liquidation, whereas when cashows are
low the manager can only afford to pay t.Providedt￿ L,the investor will choose not
to liquidate. One can show that as long as p(y —L)￿ K, this contract is feasible and
liquidation never occurs. The manager's expected payoff given zero profits for the investor
is the first-best level, px + y —K.
Although this contract achieves the first-best if it is feasible, there are three reasons to
focus on the standard debt contract. First, the non-standard debt contract is less Likely to
be feasible than the standard debt contract we have been analyzing. The condition for the
standard debt contract to be feasible is p(y —L)+ L ￿ K, which is a less stringent condition.
Second, the non-standard debt contract does not achieve the first-best solution when the
asset can be partially liquidated. In this case, the investor would demand a payment of tin
the low cash flow state in exchange for not liquidating fraction of the asset. The remaining
part of the asset would be liquidated. In fact, one can show that transfers of this sort are
equivalent to a standard debt contract without up-front transfers, but where the investor
commits to liquidating no more thaa some amount z of the asset following a defadt.
Finally, the proposed contract is vulnerable to an extreme form of opportunism. Sup-
pose that investors cannot determine cx ante whether managers have real projects in which
to invest. In particular, there are "bogus" managers who can spend K on something that
looks like a project, but in fact generates no cashflows In the non-standard debt contract,
19they will be given K + t,spendK zad walk away with the remaining i. If this contract
attracts enough of thesebogus managers, itwill not be feasible. By contrast, the standard
debtcontract does not encourage this sort of opportunism. Bogus managers would spend
K, but have no subsequent cashflows and therefore east no rents. This is one reason why
we may not observe debt contracts which provide funding in excess of the required invest-
ment. Therefore, we restrict attention to standard debt contracts because they are optimal
in reasonable settings and they generate a realistic set of inefficiencies.
5. We assume a zero required return for simplicity.
6. The one variable that is noncontractible in the model of Section I is whether or not the
project's manager diverts funds to himself. However, the ability to dived cash flows is in-
trinsic to the manager and is not a right that can be transferred by assigning ownership to
another party.
7. This ownership interpretation of the contract makes the strong assumption that an owner
can contractually commit not to interfering whatsoeverwiththe manager's consumption of
private benefits at date-2. That is, promising not to "fire" the manager if he delivers D
iscontractually equivalent to promising that the manager can keep all of the continuation
value of vifhe delivers D.Weexamine this assumption in detail in lI.C below.
8. An example of a contraèt that offers protection from firing, but at the same time does not
offer complete control is an academic tenure contract. Professors with tenure certainly are
able to enjoy some rents, but the party with the residual rights of control (i.e. the Dean)
can reduce these rents by assigning teaching loads, offices, etc.
9.Weneed to assume 4'y cL — otherwise,it will not be in owner's interest to liquidate
when the manager defaults at date I.
tO. One tricky issue raised by locating managerial effort at date 4isthat itmightmake
sense for the investor to own the project through date I (to encourage monitoring) and
then to transfer ownership to the manager if he makes the payment D(toencourage en-
trepreneurial effort). Vie do not allow for such transfers of ownership in the model. If the
manager were to choose effort at datethis conditional transfer of ownership would not be
an issue. However, the model would be more complicated because if effort is chosen before
D ispaid, managers have an additional strategic reason not to exert effort —thislowers the
20value of y which is useful in a renegotiation over the size of the date-I payment D. Since we
do not findthis effect to be particuli:rly interesting, wechoose instead to locate managerial
effortat date l.
11.Alsoasinthe earlier versionof the model, we need to assume that investors have no
troublegettingtheir handsonthe redeployment values — i.e., these cashflowscannotbe
divertedby managers.
12. For simplicity, we haveassumed thatwhen the A- and B-assets arecombined,theman-
ager of projectB is not able to divert any more in the way of private benefitsthanwhen he
justoverseestheB-assets. liiotherwords, all theincremental value L(m)that comes from
combining the assets canbeappropriated by the investor. However, thisis not crucial —
wecould extendtheanalysistoconsider thecase wheretheB-manager'sprivatebenefits
increase somewhat when the assetsarecombined. It would stillgenerallybe the casethat the
B-managerextractslesssurplusunderinternal capital allocation thanunder bank lending,
whichis all that matters for our results.
13. Recentempirical work byLamont [1993J suggests that such intra-firm liquidity spillovers
do indeed take place. He found that when oil companies' profits were hurt by the drop in oil
prices in 1986, they cut investment not only in their oil-related divisions, but also in their
non-oil-related divisions.
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